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Analysis: Helen-Ann Smith
Asia correspondent @HelenAnnSmith0
Published On the Biafra post
January 5, 2026
Nicolas Maduro needed China more than it needed him - the consequences of his removal from power are likely to be geopolitical, with some saying it arguably moves the dial on Beijing's campaign of coercion against Taiwan.
Maduro with Chinese envoy hours before capture
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Donald Trump said shortly after his action in Venezuela that it was "not going to be a problem" in terms of his relations with China because it would get more oil as a result.
The reality is, of course, far more complicated than that.
What you can be sure of is that, despite short-term costs to China, there are multiple ways in which it could (and likely already is) manoeuvring to work this situation to its advantage.
Hours before his capture, Nicolas Maduro was hosting a Chinese delegation.
Publicly, China has and will continue to express its outrage. Venezuela was one of China's major partners in Latin America and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations is consistently touted as a fundamental point of Chinese principle.
Indeed, its foreign ministry was quick to describe the US operation as "shocking" and a "clear violation of international law".
What happened after Maduro arrived in New York
Its anger might well have been compounded by the optics; just hours before his capture, Nicolas Maduro was hosting a Chinese delegation in Caracas led by its special representative on Latin American affairs, Qiu Xiaoqi.
Footage of them smiling together, seemingly oblivious to what was about to unfold, might well be seen as embarrassing to a nation that does not like to lose face.
Financially, China will be moving fast to shore up its interests, but its exposure to Venezuela is not as great as some might think.
Yes, it is the biggest buyer of Venezuelan oil, but it only makes up around 4% of the total volume of China's oil imports, and analysts say it's shielded to a degree by large volumes already en route (pre-purchased in anticipation of sanctions) and stockpiles that already exist.
In short, Maduro needed China more than China needed Maduro.
The most consequential impacts are likely to be geopolitical.
Indeed, Chinese social media has been alight with users drawing comparisons with Taiwan. They ask, if the US can unilaterally arrest the leader of a sovereign nation, what's to stop China moving to capture the leader of what they see as a renegade province?
While the precedent set by Trump in the last few days could be a dangerous one in theory, in reality it probably doesn't accelerate a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. For now, China has clearly opted for a campaign of coercion, pressure and reunification without a war.
But it does arguably move the dial within that campaign.
Can the US be persuaded to quieten its critiques when China sails close to the line of international law, for instance? Can China reasonably expect a similar 'great power exemption' that the US seems to be taking for itself?
It certainly now has more ammo in its push to persuade the world that it is a more reliable source of global leadership.
China has learnt over the last year that strength and standing your ground is the best position when it comes to operating within Trump's new world order. Do not expect that to change.
