Author: Anyi Kings
Published On The Biafra Post
August 8, 2026
First, I am impressed by the numerous compliments and thoughtful reactions I received following my analytical article, “Biafra Beyond Veto-Power Politics.” The discussion has provided an opportunity to examine more deeply the risks of loud diplomatic and agitational politics—particularly the repeated expectation that open lobbying of the United States or Israel will eventually produce a Biafra referendum or recognition.
My argument remains straightforward: diplomacy without strong institutions, a clear political vision and a coherent strategy can easily become a cycle of promises and false expectations.
For years, Biafrans have repeatedly been told that America or Israel is coming—today, tomorrow, or at some undefined moment—to order a referendum or recognize Biafra. Yet the central question remains: what institutional foundation will be presented to the international community when that diplomatic opportunity eventually arrives?
Somaliland offers an important lesson
Somaliland declared independence in 1991 and has spent decades developing many of the structures associated with statehood. It has institutions, governance structures, elections and an established political system. Yet international recognition has remained elusive.
The recent recognition by Israel may have altered Somaliland's diplomatic environment in significant ways, including potentially complicating its relations with states and actors that view Israel through competing geopolitical interests.
The lesson for Biafra is not that recognition is unimportant. It is precisely the opposite.
Recognition matters enormously.
But we must understand the distinction between building the capacity to become a state and securing international admission as a state.
Biafra needs both.
Our ultimate objective cannot simply be to create institutions and remain permanently outside the international system. Recognition is the end goal: the legitimate admission of Biafra as a sovereign state into the community of nations, including eventual membership of the African Union and the United Nations.
If we lose sight of that destination, institutionalization itself could become an end rather than a means.
At the same time, if we pursue recognition without first building the institutional foundation capable of sustaining statehood, we risk creating another cycle of diplomatic disappointment.
On territorial control: I agree with Aferek—but only to a point
This brings me to the important argument raised by my friend, Tesfa Aferek, in the discussion above.
I agree with him on one fundamental point: recognition normally comes after the establishment of credible institutions, governance and effective political authority.
However, I disagree with the implication that because recognition comes later, less emphasis should be placed on it.
Recognition is not the first step—but it remains the destination.
The question, therefore, is how Biafra can progressively develop the conditions necessary for statehood without falling into the assumption that the only available route is armed struggle or participation in Nigeria's conventional partisan political system.
Institutionalization provides the bridge
This is where I believe the institutionalization of IPOB becomes particularly important.
Institutionalization is not merely about creating an organization for its own sake. Properly structured, it provides the foundation for:
governance;
constitutional order;
legitimacy;
leadership succession;
accountability;
stability;
diplomatic engagement;
internal coordination; and
eventually, the capacity to pursue a credible political transition.
My friend Aferek raises an important question about how these objectives can be achieved without IPOB becoming involved in Nigeria's conventional democratic and partisan political system.
In my view, IPOB does not necessarily have to register as a Nigerian political party or compete for elected positions before it can advance the Biafra question.
Across the Biafra region, elected political positions—from local government chairmanships to governorships, Houses of Assembly, the House of Representatives and the Senate—are already occupied by indigenous politicians operating across different political parties.
The strategic question, therefore, should not necessarily be how IPOB can replace every existing political party.
Rather, it should be how an institutionalized IPOB can engage all sectors of society according to clearly written principles and constitutional rules while consistently pursuing its core objective.
Diplomacy is about building alliances, not issuing ultimatums
This is where diplomacy becomes indispensable.
Diplomacy is fundamentally about engagement, collaboration, shared interests, trust and strategic alliances.
Biafrans are everywhere.
Our diplomatic engagement therefore cannot be perceived as a one-sided campaign directed exclusively toward Washington, Tel Aviv, London or any other particular capital.
Biafra needs universal engagement.
We must be capable of building relationships across different geopolitical, political, economic, religious, cultural and institutional interests.
That requires an organization capable of demonstrating seriousness, predictability, discipline and institutional continuity.
And that brings us back to institutionalization.
Once political elites understand that the Biafra project is built around a clear institutional vision and that its objective is not personal intimidation, political domination or arbitrary disruption of their interests, meaningful engagement becomes possible.
The institution should be strong enough to engage political actors while also being strong enough to hold its own members and representatives accountable to its principles.
That is the distinction between institutional power and personality-driven politics.
The roadmap should be sequential—but the vision must remain complete
I therefore agree with Aferek that Biafra cannot simply jump from agitation to international recognition.
There must be a progression:
Institutionalization → Governance capacity → Constitutional order → Legitimacy → Stability → Referendum → Statehood → International recognition.
But these stages should not be interpreted as isolated objectives.
They are components of one larger strategic vision.
The referendum is not the final destination.
Biafra's statehood is the objective, and international recognition is the legitimate confirmation of that statehood within the international system.
That is why recognition must remain firmly embedded in our strategic thinking even while we acknowledge that it cannot realistically be the first step.
The Biafra question requires patience, preparation and strategic clarity
The central lesson from Somaliland should therefore be carefully understood.
Institutions without recognition can produce prolonged international isolation. Recognition without institutions can produce an unsustainable state project.
Biafra must prepare for both sides of the equation.
We need institutions capable of governing.
We need constitutional principles capable of guiding those institutions.
We need political legitimacy capable of commanding confidence.
We need diplomacy capable of building alliances across competing interests.
And ultimately, we need a credible pathway to a referendum through which the people can determine their political future.
In my view, the core principle should therefore remain diplomatic engagement across all sectors, institution-building, trust-building and strategic alliance formation—not armed struggle.
The objective is not simply to shout louder for recognition.
The objective is to build the institutional foundation that makes recognition increasingly difficult for the international community to ignore when the legitimate opportunity for a referendum and statehood emerges.
Recognition may come last—but we must never forget that it is where the road is supposed to lead.
Anyi Kings
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